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DEFECTIVE DESIGN: SECOND COLLISION INJURIES AND THE BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE-Nanda v. Ford Motor Co., 509 F.2d
213 (7th Cir. 1974)
Nanda v. Ford Motor Co. ' involved an action against the Ford
Motor Company for injuries sustained in a second collision2 with the
proximate cause being a defect in design. The facts were as follows:
At about 3:30 P.M. on October 29, 1967, plaintiff Chitta R. Nanda,
driving alone in his 1967 Ford Cortina, stopped in the inner northbound lane of Route 45 in Urbana, Illinois, to wait for an opening
in southbound traffic so that he could turn left into an access road.
While his vehicle was stopped, the Cortina was struck in the rear
by a 1962 Oldsmobile traveling at a speed as low as ten miles per
hour. This collision injured no one and caused only relatively minor
damage to the front of the Oldsmobile. The Cortina, however, was
spun around and pushed into the southbound lanes, where it was
struck in the rear by a southbound Rambler. The Rambler was
traveling at about forty miles per hour when the driver saw the
Cortina and applied the brakes, which grabbed before the collision
with the Cortina.
There was evidence that the collision with the Oldsmobile
caused a small fire which was the size and shape of a grapefruit with
a stream coming up from it on the rear of the Cortina and which,
1. 509 F.2d 213 (7th Cir. 1974).
2. "In the jargon of automobile tort law, the 'first collision' is the accident in
which the vehicle strikes another vehicle or object, and the 'second collision' occurs
when the occupants of the vehicle are exposed to an unreasonably dangerous condition
because of the design of the vehicle. The 'first collision' is not caused by the allegedly
defective design, but the 'second collision' is. A second collision with still another
vehicle, which occurred in the case at bar, is not necessarily a part of a 'second
collision' case and is not the 'second collision' to which that term refers." Id. at 217
n. 1.
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Special Liability of Seller of Produce for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
The term "unreasonably dangerous" is such a nebulous concept, its definition is subject to a
multitude of interpretations and exceptions by courts. See Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539,
301 N.E.2d 307 (1973); Cunis v. Brennan, 56 Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974).
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when the Rambler struck the Cortina, grew into a huge ball, enveloping the Cortina and the front of the Rambler. Almost
instantaneously after the second collision the inside of the Cortina
was engulfed in flames. Plaintiff suffered permanently disfiguring
and disabling bums. The plaintiff was faced with the alternative of
pursuing an action in strict liability,3 warranty, 4 or common law
negligence. The plaintiff elected strict liability, and a federal district court verdict' in his favor was appealed to the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals which affirmed the district court's decision.
The states that come within the jurisdiction of the Seventh
Circuit in diversity cases are Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin. Jurisdiction in Nanda was based on diversity with the law of Illinois'
applicable. 7 In 1966, in Evans v. Ford Motor Co.,' another diversity
case with the law of Indiana applicable, the Seventh Circuit had
established a conservative trend in design liability." Not only did
the court disclaim liability in strict liability and warranty, they also
denied liability in common law negligence. Their basic premise was
that since a collision was not a foreseeable use of an automobile, a
manufacturer could not be held liable for injuries sustained in a
collision where the design was the proximate cause of the injury. 0
Evans was highly criticized in many legal periodicals." Nevertheless, a few jurisdictions did align themselves with the pro-manufacturer stand." The court in Nanda, although it was applying
4.

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
5. Not reported.
6. Illinois has firmly established its strict liability doctrine. See Sutkowski v. Universal
Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool
Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86
Ill. App. 2d 315, 229 N.E.2d 684 (1966). See also Mieher v. Brown, 3 Ill. App. 3d 802, 805,
278 N.E.2d 869, 872 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 54 Ill.
2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
7. The statute of limitations for Illinois is two years. ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 83, §15 (SmithHurd 1972).
8. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966).
9. But cf Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802, 807 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 945 (1968) (Kiley, J. dissenting); Id. at 825 (Kiley, J. dissenting).
10. 359 F.2d at 825.
11. See 80 HARV. L. REV. 688, 689, 692 (1967) (result in Evans derives from "excessively
narrow assumption" that purpose of an automobile does not include collisions; basic assumption that a manufacturer's duty is narrower in design cases than in other negligence cases is

an anachronism and illogical; 42 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 111 (1966); 55 ILL. B.J. 238 (1966); 16
DE PAUL L. REV. 261 (1966); 4 HOUSTON L. REV. 311 (1966); 1966 UTAH L. REV. 698 (1966).

These articles were collected in Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 n.6.
12. Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
945 (1968); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967)(applying
Ohio law); Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1970); Ford Motor Co. v.
Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 224 So. 2d 726 (Miss.
1971). See also Edgar v. Nachman, 37 App. Div. 2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (3d Dep't 1971),
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Illinois law, had an excellent opportunity through dicta to further
justify its position enunciated in Evans or to disregard it. But the
3
court did neither, hiding behind technical diversity considerations."
The issue that is immediately raised is that of the propriety of the
Seventh Circuit in ignoring, under the guise of choice of law, its own
controversial precedent.
Plaintiffs' attorneys would be understandably reluctant to
bring a second collision case in federal courts when an appeal would
be heard by the Seventh Circuit. They are still faced with the question of where the Seventh Circuit stands in a diversity suit with the
law of Indiana applicable. 4 First, the Evans decision is mentioned
in Nanda as posing the query whether it would still be valid for the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to rely on Evans when applying
Indiana law. Secondly, an opportunity has been afforded them to
retain their pro-manufacturer stand by the tone of the majority
opinion in Cornette v. Searjeant Metal Products, Inc." which
adopted the strict liability doctrine for Indiana. Cited in Cornette
are a number of cases decided by the Federal District Court for
Indiana and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals which are "[an
7
excellent series of cases."'" Evans tops the list.
The Supreme Court of Indiana cited with approval the Cornette
decision without being at all critical of its language concerning narrow construction. 6 How will the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
construe Cornette in their application of Indiana law? Because of
the Seventh Circuit's failure to repudiate Evans we are forced to
interpret this as a continued assent to the Evans doctrine. The
decision to go into federal court, with Indiana law applicable and
where the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, although not relying on Evans,
held that under New York law there is no cause of action against a manufacturer for negligent
design where the design was not the initial cause of the injury but only aggravated it. Mieher
2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973) n.2.
v. Brown, 54 Ill.
13. "We are, of course, not bound by Evans, because in this case the law of Illinois
rather than Indiana is controlling." 509 F.2d at 217.
14. The statute of limitations for Indiana is two years. IND. ANN. STAT. Ch. 34, § 1-2-2
(Bums 1951).
15. 147 Ind. App. 46, 258 N.E.2d 652 (1970).
16. Id. at 656 n.2.
17. The opinion in Cornette while adopting strict liability in one breath removes its
potency and value in the next by stating that strict liability should be strictly construed and
narrowly applied. Justice Sharp in a concurring opinion was highly critical of the majority's
treatment of the strict liability issue.
Ind. __, 300 N.E.2d 335 (1973). See also
18. Ayr-way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, Lewis v. Strain Steel Corp., 6 Ill. App. 3d 142, 285 N.E.2d 631 (1972), an Illinois court's
interpretation of Cornette. This court found the Cornette opinion analogous to Suvada v.
2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). Suvada, however, is void of the
White Motors, Inc., 32 Ill.
in Cornette.
enunciated
limitations
construction
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the Seventh Circuit having appellate jurisdiction, may well be an
example of plaintiff's jumping from the frying pan into the fire. The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has failed the consumer procedurally by failing to state unequivocally its position with regard to the
Evans doctrine in Nanda. Furthermore, it has failed the consumer
in its substantive approach by adopting such a reactionary posture.
In analyzing where plaintiffs may stand in the Seventh Circuit
with Wisconsin law applicable, consumers will find little solace. 9
Wisconsin, as well as Indiana, has afforded the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals the opportunity to further its conservative position. This has been made possible through its puzzling interpretation and limited recognition of the strict liability doctrine. In Dippel
v. Sciano, ° Wisconsin's highest court adopted the strict liability
doctrine, but made no mention of subsection (2)(a) of Restatement
(Second) of Torts §402A,11 which is the heart of the Restatement
section on strict liability. However, the Wisconsin court continues
to speak in terms of negligence on the' part of the defendant. Furthermore, contributory negligence is recognized as a partial defense
to strict liability averments12
In Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc.,2 Chief Justice Hallows
clarified Wisconsin's interpretation of strict liability. Thus, Wisconsin in reality does not truly recognize strict liability since defendants are not foreclosed from proving that they were not negligent. 2
In light of the fact that Wisconsin courts continue to speak in terms
of negligence, the Seventh Circuit may have the opportunity to
reiterate its position in Evans, namely that a collision is not a foreseeable use of an automobile.
19. The statute of limitations for Wisconsin is three years. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.205
(1965).
20. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). In Grundmanis v. British Motor Corp., 308
F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970), the issue presented was whether the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action, on facts remarkably similar to those in Nanda. The court, in applying
Wisconsin law, rejected the Evans doctrine. The court pointed out that although no Wisconsin court had addressed itself to the second collision issue, Wisconsin had followed the trend
in adopting strict liability. The court, therefore, held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of
action.
21. Supra note 3.
22. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1965).
"Contributory negligence; when bars recovery. Contributory negligence shall not bar
recovery in an action by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, if such negligence was
not as great as the negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to their amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering."
23. 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974).
24. Their adaptation of strict liability is a form of negligence per se and shifts the
burden to the defendant to prove he was not negligent.
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Appellate courts by nature and design are conservative entities,
with stability and predictability being their two most important
objectives. 5 There comes a point, however, when relatively unprotected interests become so compelling that the courts must intervene. A second collision is one that most courts have recognized as
6
being compensable when caused by a defect in design. Recognizing
that an injury is compensable, however, is only the first step in a
dual process. The second step is to insure that there is compensation
for the injury. The potential harm to both life and property proximately caused by a defect in design can be devastating. When presented with such a compelling interest, the courts should, in formulating their procedural and substantive policies, insure that this
interest is well protected, contrariwise to the pro-manufacturer position taken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Evans.
The role of the courts has increased tremendously in the field
protection since MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.27
consumer
of
Judge Cardozo realized that it was as necessary then as it is now
for the courts to assume an active role in shaping public policy
where the legislature either neglects or refuses to act. The question
thus raised is to what extent the courts should, through the
adaptation of legal principles and procedural devices foster the
safety of the consumer."
The development of strict liability 9 has significantly helped the
plaintiff consumer in tort actions against manufacturers. This doctrine itself has helped balance the scales between consumers and
manufacturers in many areas of tort law. It is, however, apparent
to many that the scales remain unequally balanced in favor of the
manufacturer in second collision cases.3 1 It is, therefore, incumbent
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19 (1921).
26. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
27. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
28. This question is extensively reviewed in Nader and Page, Automobile Design and
the Judicial Process, 55 CAL. L. REV. 645, 673-77 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Nader].
29. Justice Traynor was the first to enunciate the justifications for strict liability in
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). They are as follows:
(1) Public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health interests in defective products that reach
the market.
(2) Those who suffer injury are unprepared to meet its consequences.
(3) The risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the
public.
(4) The consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for himself the
soundness of a product; and
(5) Consumers no longer approach products warily but accept them on faith, relying
on the reputation of the manufacturer or the trademark.
30. (1) The private nature of the remedy; (2) the plaintiff may have no need of monetary

25.
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upon the courts to re-evaluate their role in such cases.
The first hurdle to be crossed is the determination of whether
this is a proper judicial function or whether it is within the exclusive
domain of the legislature. Federal legislation3 has dealt with safety
standards, but automobiles are so complex that various parts or
designs often elude legislative scrutiny. Notice should be taken not
only of the number of automobile accidents resulting in serious
personal injury each year32 but also of the number of recalls.33 Pressure has been exerted upon Congress by lobbyists for the automobile
manufacturers;34 further, President Ford's support of Congressional
legislation 5 should not be relied upon.
Pressure has been exerted upon manufacturers through various
mediums, i.e., the legislatures, judgments and consumer activism,
to modify their position with respect to automobile safety. Consumers are, however, for the most part, unorganized as a collective entity. The courts can find justification for balancing the scales between manufacturers and consumers in an adversary setting. This
justification becomes apparent when courts analyze the problem of
automobile safety in the way that it would appear manufacturers
do: as a problem involving economic considerations."
Sensible business management often entails formulating an
economic equation to accurately evaluate alternatives. The cost of
an automobile is influenced by two important extra-production faccompensation; (3) the plaintiff may have no desire to litigate; (4) the plaintiff may not
suspect he has a cause of action; (5) the cost of litigation; (6) the plaintiff must link the injury
to the defective design; (7) the difficulty plaintiffs have in obtaining expert witnesses in
design; (8) deficiencies in accident reporting; (9) tactics of delay and obstruction; (10) if the
car is fixed or destroyed the evidence is lost. Nader.
31. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1966). Cf.
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1397(c) (1966), which states that
compliance does not exempt the manufacturer from common law liability.
32. The number of serious injuries caused by automobile accidents in 1973 was
2,050,000. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1975 at 954 (1974).
33. There were 7,000,996 recalls in 1973. Id. at 140.
34. The controversy with regard to crashworthiness in Congress has been centered primarily around the inflating air bag. Manufacturers' lobbyists have not fared well concerning
this issue. Gregory, Detroit and Washington Near Deadlock On Rules, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
1975, §11, at 8, col. 1. Such legislation is welcome; however its limited scope would probably
not have helped the plaintiff in Nanda.
35. "The recent word from the White House, however, has not been 'regulation.' The
Ford Administration-headed by a. man who is not only a conservative Republican but a
Michiganian as well-has been unequivocal in urging less Federal intervention in business."

Id.
36. See generally R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1974); Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distributionand the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi and
Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972); Posner, Strict
Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEG. STUDIES 205 (1973).
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tors: (1) the costs of research and design, and (2) the cost of litigation, judgments and settlements. To a degree, these two general
costs are inversely related. If less money is funneled into research
and design, the incidence of design defects should be greater, resulting in a greater number of compensable claims. If more money is
channeled into research and design, it seems likely that the incidence of compensable claims will diminish. Most would agree that
no automobile manufacturer wants to manufacture an unsafe car.
The reason that automobile manufacturers allocate a large amount
of capital for litigation, judgments and settlements is that in the
final analysis their costs may be less and subject to more accurate
calculation. This can be seen by considering important corollaries
accompanying the cost of research and design: (a) producing an
automobile that consumers can afford; (b) producing an automobile
that consumers want to purchase; and (c) keeping pace with the
developments of competitors. Manufacturers generally do not favor
channeling funds into research and design for a number of reasons,
the most basic being that the corollaries under this cost, by their
nature, defy accurate calculation. Inflation and unemployment with
the resulting financial inability to purchase, as exemplified in the
last few years, cannot be calculated with certainty over a long period
of time.37 Consumers may be unimpressed with newly developed
safety features.38 Probably most important there is a genuine fear
that once one manufacturer initiates his own research, excluding
that required by statute, competitors will also be forced to do so.
Once this happens, research may perpetuate itself and costs may
increase for the initiator who then has to keep up with his competitors' research advances.
An alternative cost which is now favored most often by manufacturers is the incurring of the costs of litigation, judgments and
settlements. Again, there are a number of corollaries. They are: (a)
insurance costs; (b) advertising to counteract unfavorable publicity;
(c) lobbying costs; (d) attorneys' fees; (e) settlement costs; and (f)
judgments. Most of the corollaries under.Variable (2) are unlike
those under Variable (1) since they are subject to accurate calculation except for settlement costs and judgment costs. Because of the
advantage the defendant manufacturer presently has, these last two
costs have been kept to a minimum in second collision injury cases.
By increasing the incidence of success on the plaintiffs' part the
37. TIME, July 14, 1975, at 52.
38. Abrahamson, Fuel Economy Counts Most In New Cars, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1975,
§ 1, at 1, col. 1.
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courts may be able to effectively force the manufacturer to reconsider the election of the cost of research and design as a more pragmatic economic alternative."
The court in analyzing the manufacturers' equation must consider a factor not present in that equation and the importance of
which cannot be over emphasized: social cost. The courts and the
consumer must come to grips with the reality that the costs will be
high. A safe automobile will be an expensive automobile. 0 The consumer will have to bear this cost; but he is in any event now bearing
the cost of an unsafe automobile.
A trend has developed whereby the courts have, through the
relaxation 4 and modification42 of evidentiary requirements, helped
the plaintiff overcome some of his disadvantages"3 in design defect
cases. This relaxation has occurred when the defect has been the
proximate cause of the accident. However, in second collision injuries, causal connection between defect and injury is not so readily
apparent. Circumstantial evidence which has been held sufficient
when the malfunction is the proximate cause of the accident may
well be insufficient in second collision cases such as Nanda. In
applying the facts of Nanda we observe that if elaborate testing had
39. In Economic Analysis of Law and Strict Liability: A Comment, supra note 36,
Posner points out factors of importance if plaintiffs are more successful. They are: (1) reduction of the potential victims' willingness to finance activity in research; (2) elimination of the
potential victims' incentive to take cost justified precautions; (3) encouraging the plaintiff
to spend more on litigation. Factors (1) and (2) would be displaced by the manufacturers if
it became more pragmatic for them to invest in research and design. If this does indeed
happen, factor (3) would be unavoidable since it would reflect a shift in the incidence of
successful litigation.
40. A corollary to the cost factor is that consumers will have to pay for safety features
they do not want because of design and performance modification.
41. See Franks v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969); Greco v.
Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); North American Aviation, Inc. v. Hughes,
247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957); McCann v. Atlas Supply Co., 325 F. Supp. 701, 703 (W.D. Pa.
1971); Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 57 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Jacobson v.
Broadway Motors, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); Williams v. Ford Motor Co.,
411 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177,
199 A.2d 826 (1964); Brownell v. White Motor Corp., 490 P.2d 184 (Ore. 1971); MacDougal
v. Ford Motor Corp., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969). In these cases the courts allowed
the proof of both a defect and the existence of a defect at the time the product left the
defendant's possession to be made by circumstantial evidence. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 638 n.4 (8th Cir. 1972).
42. "As the substance of strict liability in tort is akin to that of the law of warranty,
the evidentiary requirements to establish breach of warranty rather than those to prove
negligence should prevail in an action in strict liability in tort." Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r Co.,
283 F. Supp. 978, 982 (W.D. Pa. 1967). See also Noel, Strict Products Liability Compared
with No-Fault Automobile Accident Reparations,38 TENN. L. REV. 297, 325 (1971). Cf., Note,
21 STAN. L. REv. 1777 (1969).
43. See note 3 supra.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol1/iss1/9

19761

NOTES

not been done and expert testimony had not been procured, proof
of a defect may well have been insufficient as a matter of law.
Therefore, it is worthy of consideration to have the plaintiff
offer all of the evidence pertaining to his action that can be obtained
through a reasonable effort and is peculiar to the knowledge of the
plaintiff, excluding, of course, evidence that could only be obtained
through expert testimony. Coupled with this the plaintiff should
then have to make at least a reasonably plausable showing that a
defect in design is the proximate cause of his injury.
In applying this standard to Nanda, the plaintiff would be required to offer evidence of the existence of a small fire after the
initial collision and aggravation thereof by the subsequent collision.
At this point, the burden of producing evidence should shift, creating a presumption in favor of the plaintiff. The presumption should
persist until evidence is offered that places the balance of probabilities in equilibrium.44
Some of the positive effects would be as follows:
1. Force the manufacturer to keep statistics of defect-related
injuries and their incidence or lack thereof, resulting in better quality control of its product;
2. Make these statistics available for public consumption;
3. Create a rational allocation of the burden of proof as far as
statistical and technical information are concerned;
4. Reduce the cost of preparation for trial;
5. Help destroy the conspiracy of silence by forcing the manufacturers to bring their design experts in to testify. In the past they
have been extremely reluctant witnesses for plaintiffs;
6. Increase the incidence of settlement, thus placing a larger
percentage of the judgment in the hands of the plaintiff and less
with the attorney;
7. Allocate the cost of such injury more proportionately
throughout society; and
8. Make it a more economically viable alternative for an automobile manufacturer to invest its money in design and research
rather than in attorneys' fees and judgment costs.
One important factor which would deter the courts from adopting this proposed shift in the burden of producing evidence would
be a fear that the result would lead to a flood of litigation. However,
the long range net effect may be to reduce the number of cases that
come to trial since (1) there will be fewer claims and (2) the rate of
44.
ANNOT.,

See Hinds v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959);
85 A.L.R.2d 703 (1962).
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settlement will be greater. Furthermore, it may be feared that this
great number of cases would be laced with fraudulent claims. It
would be inequitable for courts to deny plaintiffs, with bona fide
claims, a reasonable chance of success because of the fraudulent
claims of others. After an expected period of overreaction and testing of the courts' stand on the issue by plaintiffs' attorneys, there
is no reason to suspect that the incidence of fraudulent claims will
be any greater in this area of tort law than others. In addition, costs
to consumers would be affected since the manufacturer would pass
the cost of his frequent court appearances on to the consumer. While
no one welcomes an increase in the cost of automobiles, it is more
advantageous for all of society to bear the plight of an innocent
party than for that person to bear it alone.
If this transitional period does indeed take place as it has in
other areas affected by legislation and the evolution of the strict
liability doctrine, the costs to the manufacturer and the consumer
during the period will both be high. A recent article has stated45 that
because of government control of emissions the consumer has realized a net loss. But such short term analysis neglects social cost.
Consumers cannot expect automobile manufacturers to operate at
a loss. The price will be high, but in the final analysis the result may
be a safer automobile and a more equitable loss distribution.
Anthony J. Sposaro
45. Riccardo, Regulation: A Threat to Prosperity,The New York Times, July 20, 1975,
§3, at 12, col. 2.
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